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ABSTRACT: We study the behavior of short sellers as informed market participants and 
examine potential sources of their information. Using a newly available dataset with high-
frequency short sales data, we find evidence of significant increases in short sales immediately 
prior to large insider sales, but not prior to small insider sales.  We examine a number of 
explanations that the increase in short sales is driven by public information, either about the firm 
or about the impending insider sale.  The evidence is inconsistent with these explanations, but is 
consistent with front-running facilitated by leaked information.  The front-running appears to be 
concentrated in firms with poor accounting quality, suggesting that information about a large 
insider sale reinforces short sellers’ adverse opinion about firm value when accounting quality is 
poor. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A large prior literature studies the trades of informed market participants such as firm 
insiders (Ke et al. 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Jagolinzer 2009), short sellers (Desai et 
al. 2006; Drake et al. 2011), analysts, institutional investors, and others.  Insiders are generally 
considered the most informed because they have access to non-public information.  Short sellers 
are considered particularly well-informed and sophisticated investors (Diamond and Verrecchia 
1987; Boehmer et al. 2008; Desai et al. 2006; Drake et al. 2011).  In this study we examine: (1) 
how informed short sellers are, relative to insiders; and (2) whether short sellers’ information is 
likely from public or non-public sources. Specifically, we examine whether short sellers trade 
ahead of, or following, insider sales.      
Our study is facilitated by newly available high frequency short sales data.  The intra-day 
transaction data, disclosed (monthly, not in real time) by NYSE pursuant to Regulation SHO, are 
publicly available from January 2005 to May 2007.  In contrast, the prior literature has generally 
used monthly short interest data (total short interest at one point in time, not transaction data for 
the month), or in very few instances has used proprietary transaction data.  By combining daily 
short selling with daily insider sales data, we are able to take advantage of the higher frequency 
data to conduct an event study of short sales around insider sales. 
We document significantly positive abnormal short sales in the days leading up to large 
insider sales, peaking sharply on the day of the large insider sale.  We define a large insider sale 
as the top 30 percent of all insider sales as a proportion of firm value.  For small insider sales 
(the bottom 30 percent of insider sales), we do not observe abnormal short sales prior to the 
insider sale, but rather, we observe abnormal short sales two days after the insider sale.   
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Insiders are required to disclose their trades to the SEC on Form 4 within two business 
days of the trade in the post-Sarbanes Oxley period covered by our sample (e.g., Brochet 2010), 
and the SEC makes Form 4 publicly available online in real time.  We expect the SEC filing date 
is when the general public first becomes aware of the insider trade.  When we examine short 
sales around the Form 4 filing date, we find significantly positive abnormal short sales peaking 
the day before the filing date for large insider sales, but after the filing date for small insider 
sales.   
Collectively, the evidence is consistent with short sellers front-running insider sales.  
Front-running refers to trading by some parties in advance of large trades by other parties, in 
anticipation of profiting from the price movement that follows the large trades.  The price impact 
is expected to occur if the insider sale carries information about the firm’s future fundamental 
performance.  The price impact could also occur mechanically from price pressure resulting from 
short-run liquidity effects generated by the large trade or long-run downward sloping demand for 
the stock.     
Front-running can occur when, for example, some parties are tipped off about an 
impending large sale or a brokerage trades on its own account prior to executing a client’s large 
trade.  Large (or block) trades face a latent demand problem in that large orders are not easily 
filled and therefore have to be shopped in order to discover demand.   However, traders risk 
exposing the order in the course of shopping it.  Order exposure is risky because it allows 
information about the order to be leaked, thereby creating an opportunity for front-running 
(Harris 2003).    
The existence of front-running has long been suspected on Wall Street, with allegations 
that bank or brokerage employees were leaking information about large upcoming trades to 
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favored clients such as hedge funds.  The SEC opened a sweeping investigation in 2007 by 
requesting detailed data from a number of major Wall Street banks about stock trades made on 
their own accounts or client accounts (Anderson 2007; Scannell and Smith 2007).  Numerous 
regulatory enforcement actions suggest how front-running is facilitated.  For example, in 2008, 
the SEC began looking at whether several Merrill Lynch employees “improperly placed trades 
for the brokerage house’s own account ahead of client orders” in a practice “known as front-
running” (Scannell 2008, C1).  In addition, the SEC recently charged Merrill Lynch with 
improper control of access to institutional customer order flow (SEC 2009, 1): 
According to the SEC’s order instituting proceedings, Merrill Lynch utilizes institutional 
equities "squawk boxes," which are internal intercom systems used by broker-dealers to 
broadcast institutional customer order information to traders and sales traders at the 
broker-dealer. From 2002 to 2004, several Merrill Lynch retail brokers at three branch 
offices permitted day traders at other firms to listen to confidential information on large 
unexecuted block orders of Merrill Lynch’s institutional customers. The Merrill Lynch 
brokers put their telephones next to the squawk boxes and let the day traders listen to the 
squawk box, often for the entire trading day. The day traders used the broadcasts to trade 
ahead of the orders placed by Merrill Lynch’s customers. 
 
  As another example, the Ontario Securities Commission and the Alberta Securities 
Commission in Canada recently charged information technology staff at two companies with 
snooping on confidential emails of corporate insiders and trading on this information (McFarland 
2009).  Finally, a former director and head of the New York Mercantile Exchange’s Compliance 
Committee recently pleaded guilty to delaying his clients’ orders so that he could trade ahead of 
them (Hargreaves 2008), while an analyst was dismissed for surreptitiously distributing research 
to hedge fund clients before his report was published (Schecter 2008).  In these examples, the 
information is not leaked by the investor making the trade.  Rather, the leakage appears to occur 
when the information about the upcoming trade is intercepted in the course of trade execution.  
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We further examine the role of accounting quality in front-running.  Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988) suggest that, when a firm’s prior accounting information quality is poor 
(good), investors revise their beliefs relatively more (less) in response to new information.  
Empirically, Veenman (2012) finds that insider trades trigger stronger stock market reaction 
when a firm’s prior accounting information quality is poor, suggesting that insider trades 
reinforce or disconfirm investors’ beliefs more for such firms.  In addition, Desai et al. (2006) 
show that short sellers target firms that subsequently restate earnings, suggesting that short 
sellers consider accounting information quality in their decision process. 
We therefore examine whether short sellers’ response to intercepted information about an 
upcoming large insider sale is conditioned on the firm’s accounting information quality.  In 
particular, firms with poor accounting information quality are likely associated with greater 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (e.g., Baiman and Verrecchia 1996), and 
greater divergence of opinion among investors about the firms’ equity value.  If information 
about an upcoming large insider sale reinforces short sellers’ adverse priors about a firm with 
poor accounting information quality, we expect heightened front-running of large insider sales 
for such firms.   
We use a number of different measures of a firm’s accounting information quality, 
including accrual quality (the AQ measure of Dechow and Dichev 2002), the presence of R&D 
(Aboody and Lev 2000), the magnitude of stock market reaction to past quarterly earnings 
announcements (Huddart and Ke 2007) and the relative frequency of past quarterly losses 
(Huddart and Ke 2007).  Across all four measures, front-running is generally stronger when 
accounting information quality is poor (i.e., when information asymmetry is high),  suggesting 
short sellers consider accounting information quality in their investment decision, and that news 
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of an upcoming insider sale reinforces short sellers’ adverse opinion of equity value when 
accounting quality is poor.   
 In order to examine whether front-running is profitable, we test for abnormal returns in 
the short window after large insider sales.  We find two signals that help to identify large insider 
sales that can be profitably front-run: (1) large sales by insiders at firms with poor AQ (Dechow 
and Dichev 2002) are followed by negative abnormal returns of about 3 percent in the 
subsequent twenty trading days, and (2) large insider sales identified as opportunistic (or non-
routine) by the Cohen et al (2012) algorithm are followed by negative abnormal returns of about 
1.5 percent  in the subsequent twenty trading days.   
Because our data do not allow us to establish directly the source of the front-runners’ 
information, we examine an array of alternative explanations for short sales leading insider sales, 
as described in detail in Section VIII.  In particular, one set of potential explanations includes the 
presence of adverse public information, or other confounding news events such as dividend, 
acquisition, or litigation announcements (among others), in the short window preceding the 
insider sales.  Accordingly, we conduct a detailed Factiva search and hand-collect information 
about news events in the week prior to the insider sale for half our sample.  After dropping 
observations with news events, we continue to find front-running of large insider sales in the 
selected sample.  Overall, we find that the evidence is inconsistent with all the alternative 
explanations we examine.  
Front-running facilitated by inappropriately acquired information distorts the playing 
field for market participants and can create adverse selection problems that limit market 
participation and inhibit efficient capital allocation (Harris 2003).  Information leakage can be 
curtailed by regulatory enforcement action, or by “shining light” through more timely disclosure 
 6 
of short sales by exchanges.  Exchanges disclose the level of short interest once a month in our 
sample period,
1
 which only provides a snapshot.  This is a topical issue, as the SEC has recently 
considered requiring more timely disclosures (SEC 2008).  However, regulators must also 
consider the costs of higher frequency disclosures by exchanges, on which we provide no 
evidence.   
While our evidence is more consistent with information leakage than with any of the 
alternative explanations we examine, providing definitive proof is beyond the scope of our data.  
This challenge of conclusive proof is similar to that faced in Christie and Schultz (1994), who 
find that odd-eighths quotes on NASDAQ appeared more infrequently than statistically expected.  
They interpret this evidence as suggestive of price fixing or collusion by NASDAQ dealers but 
were constrained by the scope of their data from providing definitive proof.  Similarly, Lie 
(2005) finds that options awards occur at the lowest price in the period around options grant 
dates and interprets this as suggesting options were backdated ex post.     
Section II discusses our motivation and related literature.  Section III describes our data 
and sample.  Section IV describes our event studies of short sales around insider sales.  Section 
V describes regression-based tests.  Section VI describes tests examining whether short-sellers 
front-run large insider sales when the firm’s (accounting-based) information environment is 
poor.  Section VII examines the profitability of front-running.  Section VIII discusses alternative 
explanations, and Section IX concludes.   
 
II. MOTIVATION AND RELATED LITERATURE 
Short sellers (including hedge funds) are considered particularly well-informed and 
sophisticated investors, and corporate insiders are generally considered the most informed due to 
                                                 
1
 NYSE now reports twice a month. 
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their access to non-public information. Examining the lead-lag relation between the trades of the 
two groups is thus a powerful setting to study whether short sellers’ information is from public or 
non-public sources.    
Examining front-running of insider sales has a number of advantages.  First, insiders’ 
Form 4 filings allow us to identify the exact date of sale and thereby to conduct an event study of 
short sales around the insider sale date.  Second, because insiders are likely the most informed of 
traders, trading in advance of insiders is unlikely to be due to superior information. This rules out 
attribution of the front-running to superior information.  Below, we briefly discuss related 
literature to place our study in context.   
Front-Running   
 Front-running is frequently alleged in practitioner circles, and was widely believed to 
have occurred around the Long Term Capital Management debacle of 1998.  The empirical 
literature on front-running is relatively small, likely due to the difficulty of directly testing for 
front-running and the absence of relevant and publicly available data.  Chen et al. (2008) present 
indirect evidence consistent with hedge funds front-running fire sales by distressed mutual funds, 
although they do not examine what mechanisms facilitate the front-running.  Chakravarty and Li 
(2003) use proprietary audit trail transaction data, and suggest that dual traders at the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange do not engage in front-running.  
Short Selling   
 A number of studies suggest that short sellers are informed traders, by showing that short 
sales predict returns (Desai et al. 2002; Asquith et al. 2005; Boehmer et al. 2008; Diether et al. 
2009).  Other studies suggest short sellers exploit predictable mean-reversion in valuation 
multiples (Dechow et al. 2001), anticipate adverse news in earnings announcements (Christophe 
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et al. 2004) and earnings restatements (Desai et al. 2006), and are relatively more informed than 
analysts (Drake et al. 2011), consistent with short sellers being sophisticated or informed 
investors.  However, Daske et al. (2005) assert that short sellers do not anticipate bad news 
events and are therefore unlikely to be informed traders. 
Evidence on whether short sellers are informed is important because it bears on: (1) a 
potential cost, through loss of value-relevant information, of restricting short sales (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1987; Ofek and Richardson 2003); and (2) a potential benefit of higher frequency 
disclosures of short sales, such as outstanding daily or weekly short interest (Aitken et al. 1998; 
Christophe et al. 2004).    
Insider Trading   
 There is an extensive literature on insider trading.  One related branch is the literature on 
return predictability of insider sales.  The evidence in Seyhun (1986, 1998), Damodaran and Liu 
(1993), Jagolinzer (2009) and Cohen et al. (2012) suggests that insider sales predict negative 
abnormal returns,
2
 and the evidence in Ke et al. (2003) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) 
suggests that insider trades predict the firm’s future earnings performance.   
If large insider sales carry more information, front-running or information leakage is 
more likely for large insider sales.  Seyhun (1986, 1998) shows that larger insider sales (as a 
proportion of firm value) result in more negative abnormal stock returns, while Datta and 
Iskandar-Datta (1996) show that the size of the insider sale is a signal used by bond traders in 
identifying information-motivated insider sales.   
 
                                                 
2
 However, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jeng et al. (2003) do not find evidence that insider sales predict negative 
returns.  
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III. DATA AND SAMPLE 
Data and Variable Definitions  
 We obtain daily returns, prices and shares outstanding from CRSP, and annual 
accounting data from Compustat.  We obtain intra-day short sales transactions data from the 
NYSE TAQ database that reports short sales on NYSE from January 2005 through May 2007, 
pursuant to Regulation SHO.  We aggregate intraday data to obtain daily short sales data.  Insider 
trading data are from the Thomson Financial Insider database.  All variable definitions are 
presented in the notes to Table 2.   
Sample 
Table 1 describes the sample selection procedure.  We start with all open market insider 
sales as reported to the SEC in Table 1 of Form 4 (Seyhun 1998; Ke et al. 2003), where the 
insider is the CEO.  We then delete insider trading records assigned a cleansing code of “A” or 
“S” by Thomson Financial (Narayanan and Seyhun 2008).3  After merging the different datasets, 
ensuring that we have an estimation window for all insider sales events, eliminating insider sales 
events that have earnings announcements within 15 trading days, and eliminating insider sales 
that do not fall on the first day of the sale, we are left with a final sample of 2,030 insider sales 
events.  Some insider sales are executed over multiple days. In such cases, we measure the size 
of the insider sale based on first day sales, but the results are robust when we measure size based 
on sales summed over up to five consecutive days.
4
  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
3
 According to Thomson Financial, these cleansing codes identify observations for which: (1) collection 
requirements were not met; (2) numerous data elements were missing or invalid; or (3) reasonable assumptions 
could not be made. 
4
 The correlation between the size of the insider sale measured based on first day or multiple consecutive day sales is 
large (over 0.9).   
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Table 2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the full sample.  The mean firm size of 
7.84 implies a mean market value of about $2.5b, so the firms in our sample are large firms on 
average.  The mean market/book is 3.85, suggesting the presence of some growth firms.  The 
mean of Average Daily Short Sales is 0.19 percent, while the mean Event Date Short Sales is 
0.20 percent.  This suggests short sales are higher on the insider sale date than on other days by 
about 0.01 percent of shares outstanding in the full sample.  The mean of Average Daily Short 
Transactions is 449, while the mean Event Date Short Transactions is 538, indicating that the 
number of short sale transactions increases by about 20 percent on average on insider sale dates.  
The mean Insider Sales is 0.06 percent of shares outstanding, but 8.13 percent of trading volume.  
Finally, the mean Frequency of Insider Sales is 3.2 distinct sales events per firm over the entire 
sample period. 
Panel B (C) of Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for large (small) insider sales, where 
we define large (small) sales as the top (bottom) 30 percent of insider sales as a percent of firm 
market value.  Mean insider sales are 19.38 percent of normal daily trading volume for large 
sales but 1.24 percent of daily trading volume for small sales.  Firm size and shares outstanding 
are smaller and market/book ratios are larger for the large insider sale sample than for the small 
insider sample, suggesting firms in the large insider sale sample are relatively smaller and have 
higher expected growth than firms in the small insider sale sample.  The mean of Event Date 
Short Sales is 0.27 percent (0.18 percent) for the large (small) insider sale sample, while the 
Average Daily Short Sales is 0.21 percent (0.18 percent) for the large (small) insider sale sample.  
This implies that short sales increase by 0.06 percent of shares outstanding on large insider sales 
dates, but do not increase on small insider sales dates.  Finally, the mean Frequency of Insider 
 11 
Sales is 1.8 (2.7) for the large (small) insider sales sample, indicating that CEOs at firms in the 
large insider sale sample trade less frequently than those in the small insider sale sample. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In untabulated results we find that neither short sales nor insider sales appear 
concentrated in any month, which is inconsistent with any calendar time-based explanation (e.g., 
tax) for the pattern of shorts leading insiders that we document in the next section.  In addition, 
the sample is not dominated by any particular industry.  
 
IV. EVENT STUDIES 
Short Sales around the Insider Sale Date   
 We conduct an event study of short sales around insider sales using the methodology 
described in MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997, Ch. 4).  The event is the insider sale, 
and day 0 is the day the insider sale is executed.  If the insider sale is executed over multiple 
days, we take the first day of execution as day 0.  The particular insider we consider is the CEO.  
Our test window is the [-10, +10] trading day window around the insider sale.  The estimation 
window, used to estimate the normal or expected level of daily short sales, is the [-60, -11] 
trading day window.   
 We ensure that the test window is free from events that are known to affect short sales.  
In particular, we exclude from our sample events with earnings announcements in the [-15, +15] 
trading day window for two reasons: (1) Bettis et al. (2000) report that many firms restrict 
insiders to trading three to twelve trading days after earnings announcements, such that insider 
trades in this period are predictable once earnings are announced; (2) Christophe et al. (2004) 
show that short sales increase prior to negative earnings announcement, so it is important to 
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ensure that the increasing short sales we observe are in anticipation of the insider sale rather than 
in anticipation of the earnings announcement.  We also exclude the earnings announcement week 
from the estimation window, since this window is used to calculate “normal” daily short sales.  
 For a given firm-event, denote short sales on any day in the event window as Shi,n, where 
i indexes the day and takes any value in [-10, +10] and n indexes the firm-event.  Denote short 
sales on any day in the estimation window as Shj,n, where j indexes the day and takes any value 
in [-60, -11].  The normal or expected level of daily short sales for any firm-event, E(Shn), is 
calculated as the mean daily short sales in the estimation window: 
E(Shn) = 
J
1



11
60
j
j
Shj,n  ,        (1) 
where J is the number of days in the estimation window.  The variance of abnormal short sales 
for a given firm-event is: 
σ2(en) = 
1
1
J



11
60
j
j
{Shj,n - E(Shn)}
2
 .      (2) 
Using these estimates from the estimation window, the abnormal short sales for a given 
firm-event on any day in the event window is: 
ei,n = Shi,n - E(Shn).  i[-10, +10]       (3) 
For statistical inference, we aggregate abnormal short sales across all firm-events for 
each day in the estimation window: 
EN (ei) = 
N
1


N
n 1
ei,n ,  i[-10, +10]       (4) 
where N is the number of firm-events (=2,030 insider sales events in the case of the full sample) 
and EN(ei) is the average abnormal short sales on event day i.  The variance of the average 
abnormal short sale for day i is: 
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σ2[EN(ei)] = (1/N
2
) 

N
n 1
σ2(en) .        (5) 
Figure 1, Panel A shows average abnormal short sales, EN(ei), for trading days i=-10 to 
i=+10.  Abnormal short sales increase before the insider sale and peak on the day of the sale, 
suggesting advance knowledge of the insider sale.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Short Sales around the Form 4 Filing Date 
During our sample period from January 2005 to May 2007, insiders are required under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to report sales electronically on Form 4 within two business 
days of the sale, and the SEC makes Form 4 available online (through EDGAR) on the day of 
filing.  We expect the filing date is when the sale becomes known publicly, so we examine 
abnormal short sales around the Form 4 filing date.  The methodology is the same as described 
above, except that the event is the Form 4 filing date (the filing date is day 0).   
Figure 1, Panel B shows average abnormal short sales, EN(ei), for trading days i=-10 to 
i=+10 around the Form 4 filing date.  Abnormal short sales rise sharply two days before, and 
peak one day before, day 0, suggesting advance knowledge of the insider sale. 
Front-Running and Insider Sale Size 
Large sales are likely to have larger price impact or more information content than small 
sales (Seyhun 1986, 1998; Datta and Iskandar-Datta 1996).  If short sellers have advance 
knowledge of insider sales, we expect the front-running to be more pronounced for large insider 
sales.  We therefore conduct an event study of abnormal short sales around large insider sales 
and around small insider sales, using the methodology described above.  We split the sample into 
large and small insider sales, where we define large (small) sales as the top (bottom) 30 percent 
of insider sales as a percent of firm market value.   
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It is possible that large insider sales are not informative for prices if informed insiders 
fragment their sale in order to mask its information content (Barclay and Warner 1993) or to 
price discriminate (Harris 2003).  We expect this is unlikely to be an issue because we use the 
total sale, rather than transaction size, to identify large sales.     
Table 3 shows daily abnormal short sales, EN(ei), in the [-10, +10] day window around 
large and small insider sales. The t-statistics are calculated using equations (4) and (5).  Figure 2, 
Panel A provides a graphical depiction, showing that abnormal short sales are positive before a 
large insider sale, and have a pronounced peak on the day of the large insider sale.  In contrast, 
there does not appear to be a relation between abnormal short sales and small insider sales in the 
pre-event window, but abnormal short sales on day +2 following a small insider sale are 
significantly positive.   
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
We repeat the analysis by examining abnormal short sales around the Form 4 filing date 
for large versus small insider sales.  In Figure 2, Panel B, day 0 is the SEC Form 4 filing date. 
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the same pattern as Panel A, except that abnormal short sales show a 
pronounced increase two days before the SEC filing date, and peak one day before the SEC 
filing date, for large insider sales.   
The pattern of abnormal short sales around large insider sales, contrasted with abnormal 
short sales around small insider sales in both panels of Figure 2, is consistent with advance 
knowledge of the impending insider sale. 
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In our main tests described above, the number of shares sold by the insider is scaled by 
total shares outstanding (Seyhun 1986; Brochet 2010).   We examine whether results are robust 
to: 
(1) Scaling insider sales by normal daily trading volume (average daily trading volume in the 
estimation window).  The correlation between insider sales scaled by shares outstanding and 
insider sales scaled by trading volume is large (0.84), and results remain robust;   
(2) Using unscaled insider sales (i.e., the dollar amount) to identify large and small sales.  In 
untabulated results 
5
 we find that abnormal short sales are significantly positive in the seven 
trading days before large (top 30%), but not before small (bottom 30%), unscaled insider sales.  
In contrast, abnormal short sales are significantly positive in the days subsequent to small, but 
not large, insider sales.  This suggests short sellers respond to all insider sales as they find out 
about them.  When information about large insider sales is leaked ahead of time, short sellers 
front-run.  When information about small insider sales is discovered through the SEC filing by 
day +2, short sellers respond on day +3 to +7.  Thus, the result is consistent with our main results 
and their interpretation. 
 Further, while our main tests identify large (small) insider sales as the top (bottom) 30% 
by insider sale size, the results are robust to defining large (small) insider sales as the top 
(bottom) quintile or decile of insider sale size. 
Cross-Sectional Clustering 
 If insider sale events are clustered in calendar time, the t-statistics reported in Table 4 
should be adjusted for cross-sectional dependence.  Following MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell 
et al. (1997, Ch.4), we adjust standard errors for cross-sectional dependence using a portfolio 
                                                 
5
 Available upon request. 
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approach, whereby abnormal short sales are aggregated into a portfolio if they share the same 
event date in calendar time.   
To implement the portfolio approach, we calculate the portfolio abnormal short sales for 
each event day i=-10 to i=+10 as follows: 
ei,p = 
),(
1
tiN

n
{ei,n | n p } ,       (6) 
where p denotes a portfolio-event.  In other words, p is a portfolio consisting of all firm-events 
that share the same event date in calendar time, and N(i,t) is the number of firm-events on 
calendar day t that have the same event day i.  For example, if two firms x and y both have event 
day i=-5 on June 1, then the portfolio abnormal short sales for day i=-5 on June 1 is 
2
1
(e-5,x +   
e-5,y).  We then repeat this procedure for each calendar day t and each event day i.  The median of 
N(i,t) for the large insider sale sample is 1, the mean is 2 and the standard deviation is 1.57.  This 
evidence suggests that cross-sectional dependence is unlikely to be an issue in the results 
reported earlier, as we confirm next. 
 We use two approaches to calculate the t-statistics.  For the first approach, it is useful to 
note that the procedure above yields a time series of portfolio abnormal short sales for each event 
day i.  In other words, we have 21 time series of portfolio abnormal short sales, one for each 
event day i=-10 to i=+10.  We use the time series mean and standard error to calculate the mean 
abnormal short sales and associated t-statistic for each event day i, in the spirit of Fama and 
MacBeth (1973).  We find that the results in Table 3 are virtually unchanged, suggesting cross-
sectional dependence is not an issue in our event studies. 
 Under the second approach, we estimate the average abnormal short sales on event day i 
and the variance of abnormal short sales using estimation window parameters (Campbell et al. 
 17 
1997).  In other words, we apply the firm-event-level method outlined earlier to portfolio-events.  
The easiest way to see this is to replace the subscript “n” in equations (1) to (5) with “p.” We 
find the Table 3 results are robust to this approach as well.  Overall, the results suggest cross-
sectional clustering is not an issue in our sample and our inferences are robust.  
Alternative Normal Short Sales Model 
 For robustness, we consider the effect of using an alternative model of the expected or 
normal level of daily short sales.  The normal level was previously given by equation (1).  We 
begin by estimating the following regression in the estimation window for each firm-event: 
Shj,n = β1,n + β2,nRetj,n + β3,nRetj-1,n + β4,nHILOj,n + β5,nHILOj-1,n  
+ β6,nVOLj,n + β7,nVOLj-1,n + uj,n .      (7) 
Ret is the firm’s daily stock return, HILO is the firm’s intraday stock price volatility, and VOL is 
the stock’s daily trading volume.  These control variables adjust for short sales that are driven by 
speculation that the stock is temporarily overpriced (if daily returns are high), by heightened 
intraday price volatility that affords greater opportunity for profit, or by higher trading volume 
that affords an opportunity to earn a liquidity premium.  We do not control for firm-level 
characteristics such as size in equation (7) because the equation is estimated for each firm-event, 
and hence, each firm is its own control when we calculate abnormal short sales. 
 We estimate the normal or expected level of daily short sales on any event day i by fitting 
regression equation (7) using values of the independent variables on event day i and parameter 
estimates from the estimation window regression.  The abnormal short sales on event day i 
equals the short sales on day i minus the expected short sales.  The variance of abnormal short 
sales is estimated as the variance of uj,n. We then proceed using the firm-event-level 
methodology outlined earlier, applied to the portfolio-level to control for cross-sectional 
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clustering.  The results suggest abnormal short sales are significantly positive on event days 0, -1 
and -4 for large insider sales, but there is no evidence of front-running in the small insider sales 
sample.   
We also use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach to control for cross-sectional 
correlation in calculating the t-statistics, as described in Section IV (“first approach”), and find 
significantly positive abnormal short sales on days -1 and -4 for large insider sales.  Overall, 
these results suggest our inferences are robust. 
 
V. REGRESSION-BASED TESTS 
As an alternative to the event study methodology, we use a regression-based approach.  
We estimate event-specific regressions as given in equation (7), but we add an event indicator 
variable that is 1 in the [-5, 0] trading day window before the insider sale, and 0 in the [-60, -11] 
day estimation window.  Therefore, each regression has 56 observations (6 days from the event 
window and 50 days from the estimation window).  The variable of interest is the event 
indicator. 
Table 4 reports mean coefficients from these regressions, and t-statistics based on the 
standard error of the mean coefficient across the regressions.  The table shows a significant event 
effect for the large insider sales sample, but not for the small insider sales sample.  This finding 
indicates that, for large insider sales, short sales are significantly higher in the [-5, 0] day 
window than in the [-60, -11] day estimation window, where day 0 is the insider sale date.  To 
address potential cross-sectional dependence concerns with the t-statistics reported in Table 4, 
we note that the regression-based test is very similar to the test described in Section IV.  Since 
the test in Section IV was implemented at the portfolio level and yielded robust inferences, we 
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expect the significance levels in Table 4 are robust.  However, we conduct randomization tests 
described below to test robustness. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We conduct randomization tests as follows:  (1) recall that for a given insider sale event, 
we have 56 days associated with the event, 50 days in the estimation window and six days in the 
event window.  We start by redefining the event indicator as 1 for six randomly selected days out 
of the original estimation window of 50 days, and 0 for all other days (including the true event 
days); (2) we do the same for all insider sale events, and then run 608 regressions, one for each 
of the 608 large insider sale events; (3) we compute the mean of the 608 event indicator 
coefficients, and the t-statistic based on the standard error of the 608 coefficients.  This yields 
one t-statistic that we can compare to the t-statistic of 2.82 reported in Table 4; (4) we repeat this 
procedure 1000 times, to obtain 1000 t-statistics.   
In the 1000 trials, we find that a t-statistic of 2.82 has a probability less than 0.001, and 
the probability of obtaining a t-statistic greater than 1.64 is 0.015.  This suggests the significant 
mean event indicator coefficient reported in Table 4 is due to a strong “treatment effect” rather 
than simply chance. 
We verify that the Table 4 result is robust to excluding day 0 and defining the event 
indicator as 1 in the [-5, -1] day window, in order to ensure that the significant event indicator for 
large insider sales is not driven by the heightened short sales on day 0.  The event indicator 
coefficient in this case is 0.008 with a t-statistic of 2.23 (one-tailed p<0.05). We also define the 
event indicator as 1 in the [-3, -1] day window. The event indicator coefficient in this case is 
0.006 with a t-statistic of 1.45 (one-tailed p<0.10).  Finally, when we define the event indicator 
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as 1 in the window [-10, 6], we obtain an insignificant coefficient of 0.002 (t = 0.64), suggesting 
short sales on days -6 to -10 are not abnormally high. 
Overall, the regression result is consistent with the event studies of Section IV, and 
suggests advance knowledge of insider sales.   
 
VI. EFFECT OF THE FIRM’S ACCOUNTING INFORMATION QUALITY 
 Poor quality accounting information is likely associated with greater information 
asymmetry between the firm and outsiders (Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; Skaife et al. 2012) and 
greater divergence of opinion among investors about the firm’s equity value.  If intercepted 
information about an upcoming large insider sale reinforces short sellers’ adverse opinion of 
firms with poor accounting quality, we expect heightened front-running of large insider sales for 
such firms.   
 Several studies suggest the importance of a firm’s accounting information quality in 
interpreting newly arriving information that is potentially value-relevant.  For example, 
theoretical work by Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) shows that, when the prior information set 
is of poor quality, new information allows greater revision of investors’ prior cash flow 
expectations (see also Verrecchia 1980).  Empirically, Veenman (2012) shows that insider 
purchase filings trigger greater market reactions for firms with poor earnings quality, suggesting 
greater revision of beliefs when the accounting information environment is of poor quality (Teoh 
and Wong 1993; Francis et al. 2007).  In addition, Desai et al. (2006) show that short sellers 
target firms that subsequently restate earnings, suggesting that short sellers consider accounting 
information quality in their decision process. 
 The quality of publicly available accounting information is likely negatively associated 
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with information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, and when information asymmetry is 
high, the insider sale is likely perceived by front-runners to be informative with respect to future 
firm performance (e.g., Veenman 2012).  We use the following measures of information 
asymmetry between the firm and outsiders:  
(1) the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of accounting quality (AQ), where a poor 
accrual – cash flow mapping indicates poor accounting quality. We expect poor accounting 
quality to be associated with higher information asymmetry;  
 (2) Research and Development expenses (R&D), where positive (zero) R&D expense 
indicates high (low) information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev 2000);  
(3) the median magnitude of short-window abnormal returns around quarterly earnings 
announcements in the past five years (Mag_AR), where higher abnormal returns indicate higher 
information asymmetry (Huddart and Ke 2007);  
(4) the relative frequency of quarterly losses in the last five years (Loss Freq),  where 
higher loss frequency indicates higher information asymmetry (Huddart and Ke 2007).  
For each information asymmetry measure (except R&D which is an indicator variable), 
we split the large insider sales sample into the top and bottom 30 percent and middle 40 percent 
of information asymmetry.  We then examine abnormal short sales around the insider sale when 
information asymmetry is high versus low, and expect front-running when information 
asymmetry is high.   
 Panel A (Panel B) of Table 5 shows abnormal short sales around large insider sales when 
information asymmetry is high (low). Abnormal short sales are generally significantly positive in 
the days before a large insider sale for all high information asymmetry measures, but not for all 
low information asymmetry measures.  This evidence suggests that short sellers respond to 
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information about a large insider sale by front-running more when information asymmetry is 
high than when it is low.  In untabulated tests, we find no front-running of small insider sales for 
either high or low information asymmetry firms.  
Overall, these results suggest the importance of accounting quality in interpreting newly 
arriving information.  When accounting quality is poor, information asymmetry is likely high 
and the insider sale is perceived by some short sellers to be informative, thereby triggering front-
running. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 In additional untabulated tests, we examine whether short sellers appear to anticipate 
changes in the firm’s future fundamental performance as measured by future earnings (EPS and 
ROA) changes.  In particular, we partition the large insider sale sample into quintiles of future 
earnings change (t+1 relative to t-1), and examine abnormal short sales around large insider sales 
for the bottom quintile of future earnings change.  If future earnings changes are anticipated by 
front-runners, we expect front-running in the bottom quintile of future earnings changes.  The 
results do not support such anticipation, consistent with short sellers reacting (and more strongly 
so when the firm’s accounting quality is poor) to information that an insider is about to make a 
large sale without knowing the motive for the insider sale.   
 
VII. PROFITABILITY OF FRONT-RUNNING 
 In this section we examine abnormal stock returns following insider sales, in order to 
assess whether front-running is profitable.  Abnormal returns are defined as size-adjusted returns 
(Sloan 1996; Bradshaw et al. 2006; Veenman 2012).  Table 6 shows average cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR), and their t-statistics, in the [-10, -1], [0, +10] and [0, +20] trading day 
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windows around large and small insider sales.  CAR is significantly positive in the [-10, -1] 
window for both large and small insider sales.  This evidence suggests that (1) short selling 
before large insider sales does not appear to be a response to adverse public information about 
the firm; and (2) the similar CAR pattern prior to both large and small insider sales can not 
explain why short sellers front-run large, but not small, insider sales.       
Table 6 also shows that CAR in the [0, +10] and [0, +20] trading day windows is 
insignificant.  We therefore examine whether short sellers profitably condition front-running of 
large insider sales on additional signals.  In particular, Table 5 showed that front-running of large 
insider sales occurs in poor accounting quality firms, so we examine whether such front-running 
is profitable.  Table 7 shows that front-running in firms with poor AQ is profitable in both the [0, 
+10] and [0, +20] trading day windows following a large insider sale, yielding about 3 percent 
abnormal returns in the latter window.  Therefore, short sellers conditioning their front-running 
on poor accounting information quality as measured by AQ appear to profit from front-running.   
Cohen et al. (2012) develop an algorithm to identify opportunistic insider sales and show 
that such sales have return predictability.  In this study we focus on large versus small insider 
sales as a front-running signal, rather than opportunistic versus routine insider sales, for two 
reasons.  First, the large versus small insider sale classification is readily observable to any 
market participant, while the opportunistic versus routine classification relies on a fairly involved 
algorithm. Second, the opportunistic versus routine classification is new, at least to academics, 
and therefore it is unclear that the classification was exploited by market participants in our 
sample period of 2005-2007. 
In order to examine whether front-runners appear to distinguish between opportunistic 
and routine insider sales, we sort large and small insider sales further into opportunistic and 
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routine insider sales.
6
  In untabulated results
7
 we find that short sellers front-run large 
opportunistic insider sales, and do not front-run either small opportunistic or small routine inside 
sales, consistent with our prediction. However, inconsistent with our prediction, we find that 
short sellers front-run large routine insider sales.  Next we examine whether opportunistic and 
routine large insider sales are followed by negative abnormal returns.  As Table 8 shows, 
opportunistic insider sales in our large insider sale sample yield significant negative CAR of 
about 1.5 percent in the 20 trading days following the insider sale.  Routine insider sales in the 
same sample are not followed by significantly negative CAR.  We interpret the evidence as 
suggesting that the average front-runner does not appear to be aware of the distinction between 
opportunistic and routine insider sales as identified by the Cohen et al. (2012) algorithm, but 
front-runners who do distinguish between opportunistic and routine large insider sales can use 
the signal to front-run profitably.  Alternatively, if short sellers are aware of the distinction 
between opportunistic and large insider sales, and can distinguish between them, then the result 
above is inconsistent with our front-running hypothesis.   
Overall, the results suggest that front-running is a risky strategy, but that sophisticated 
short sellers who condition their front-running on poor AQ and opportunistic insider sales can 
gain abnormal returns. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
                                                 
6
 Details are available upon request.  We are grateful to Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski for sharing their opportunistic 
trade data. 
 
7
 Available upon request. 
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VIII. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
In this section we describe robustness tests and examine a number of competing 
explanations (to the explanation that front-running is facilitated by non-public information) for 
the pattern of short sales leading large insider sales.  We test these explanations using event 
studies at the portfolio-level to control for cross-sectional clustering.   
Confounding News Events in the Pre-Insider Sale Window   
As noted earlier, our tests exclude earnings announcements from the pre-insider sale 
window.  In order to further ensure a clean test window and rule out potential attribution of our 
results to confounding events, we hand-collect data by conducting a detailed Factiva search for 
news events in the week prior to the insider sale.  In order to keep the data collection 
manageable, we conduct the search for our sample firms from November 2005 through 
November 2006 (about half the length of our full sample of 27 months).  The search revealed 82 
(75) news events in the week prior to the 312 large (313 small) insider sales during this period.  
The events are dividend announcements, M&A announcements, share repurchases, litigation, 
earnings restatements, options exercise by insiders, credit rating changes, asset divestitures, 
executive turnover, and conference calls. 
Two features of the results are of note.  First, there is generally no substantial difference 
in the frequency of any of these news events within the large insider sale sample relative to the 
small insider sale sample.  If the pattern of short sales front-running large, but not small, insider 
sales were due to these confounding news events, we would expect substantially more news 
events in the large insider sale sample.   
Second and more importantly, we exclude from our tests all observations with 
confounding events, and continue to find robust evidence of short sales front-running large, but 
 26 
not small, insider sales in the November 2005 to November 2006 sample.
8
  Overall, we conclude 
that confounding news events are unlikely to explain our results. 
Liquidity Provision or Speculation by Contrarian Short Sellers  
 Table 5 shows positive cumulative abnormal returns prior to all insider sales, especially 
for large insider sales.  Therefore, it is possible that short sellers are speculating that the stock is 
temporarily overpriced, or are attempting to earn a premium for providing liquidity if there is 
temporary buying pressure on the stock.  The entirety of the evidence is inconsistent with these 
hypotheses for two reasons: (1) these hypotheses do not explain why insiders sell a few days 
later, since insiders are unlikely to trade to exploit temporary mispricing or to provide temporary 
liquidity (Seyhun 1998); (2) these hypotheses do not explain the differential response of short 
sales to the size of the insider sale. That is, they do not explain why short sales do not lead small 
insider sales even though abnormal returns are increasing and positive before small insider sales,  
nor why short sales increase two days after small insider sales when abnormal returns are non-
positive and there is presumably less buying pressure.     
In addition, the event study of Section IV and the regression test of Section V suggest 
that, in the large insider sale sample, short sales are significantly higher in the pre-insider sale 
window after controlling for contemporaneous and lagged stock returns, trading volume, and 
price volatility (proxies for the speculation and liquidity provision motives).  Therefore, the 
contrarian short sale (for large insider sales) in the pre-insider sale window is inconsistent with 
liquidity provision and speculation explanations.   
Inventory Management by Market Makers  
                                                 
8
 Given both the low frequency of news events in the insider sales sample we examine, as well as robustness of 
results to dropping the relevant observations, we do not hand-collect news events for the other half of our sample. 
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Under this hypothesis, market makers short sell in advance of an insider sale in order to 
hedge their purchase from the insider.  To examine this possibility, we identify short sales by 
market makers (labeled “exempt” in the Reg SHO data) and exclude these from our large insider 
sale sample.
9
 We continue to find robust evidence of front-running. 
Advance Information from Form 144  
Under this hypothesis, short sellers legally acquire information about upcoming insider 
sales from insiders’ Form 144 filings.  We believe it is unlikely that this hypothesis explains our 
evidence for the following reasons. First, Form 144 identifies a proposed sale date but the insider 
does not have to sell on this date.  The insider can sell anytime within three months of filing, or 
can re-file if the window expires prior to sale.  This suggests the sale date can not be predicted in 
advance by others. Second,  Form 144 identifies the number of shares expected to be sold but the 
insider does not have to sell this many shares, and also can sell those shares in smaller blocks on 
different days within three months.  Thus, the amount to be sold on a particular date likely 
cannot be predicted by others in advance, which is required for front-running. Third, Form 144 
does not have to be filed prior to every insider sale (for example, if the shares to be sold have 
previously been registered with the SEC), suggesting that it is not a consistent source of 
information.   
To empirically examine this hypothesis, we use the Thomson Financial database and 
identify five Form 144s with proposed sales dates falling within one week before the actual sale 
date.  Results are robust to excluding these five insider sales.   
Advance Information from 10b5-1Plan Disclosures   
                                                 
9
 Pilot securities under Reg SHO were excluded from the requirement to label market-maker shorts as “exempt.”  
Therefore, market-maker shorting activity in Pilot securities is unobservable in our data.  We expect this is unlikely 
to alter our inferences for the combined reasons that Pilot securities comprise one-third of NYSE securities and 
market-maker short sale activity is economically insignificant compared to non-market-maker short sale activity 
(e.g., Boehmer and Wu 2012). 
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Some corporate insiders may set up a 10b5-1 plan to sell a specified number of shares 
over a specified future period, according to a specified algorithm.  The plan cedes execution 
authority to a third party, usually a broker.  Such a plan provides insiders with affirmative 
defense against possible insider trading allegations.  Public disclosure of 10b5-1 plans is not 
mandated, but voluntary advance disclosure is allowed in Form 8-K.  Voluntary disclosures may 
simply disclose the existence of the plan, or may provide more details about the plan. 
In a comprehensive search of all corporate 8-K filings between 2000 and 2006, 
Henderson et al. (2012) find only 773 disclosures.  They find an additional 894 disclosures in 
Form 4s, but these are not relevant in our study since the Form 4 is filed after the insider sale.  Of 
the 1,667 disclosures (i.e., 773+894) they find, more than 94 percent do not disclose sufficient 
details about the plan to allow front-running.  Of the disclosures that provide more plan details, a 
sample plan in Henderson et al. (2012) does not disclose the precise date the shares are to be sold 
(it only specifies the number to be sold in a given month over the next twelve months).  Given 
this evidence, we expect 10b5-1 disclosures are unlikely to be an explanation for the pattern of 
short sales leading large insider sales. 
Further Robustness Tests 
Definition of Insider 
 Our main tests define the CEO as the insider.  To test robustness with respect to this 
definition, we examine large and small sales by the President, CFO and COO, and continue to 
find strong evidence of short sellers front-running large, but not small, sales by these insiders 
(the results are stronger for the President and CFO).   
Sales by Other Insiders   
To ensure that short sales are not responding to sales by insiders other than the CEO, who 
 29 
sell just before the CEO, we exclude the 148 large CEO sales events with sales by other insiders 
(the top 5 executives) in the previous five trading days.  Results remain robust.  
Other Tests 
 We examine a number of other potential ways short sellers could have foreknowledge of 
insider sales.  For example, the insider sale might occur on IPO lockup expiration dates that are 
publicly known, or the insider sale might occur on option vesting dates that are publicly known.  
We find robust results after controlling for these alternative explanations.
10
 
    
IX. CONCLUSION 
We examine short sales around insider sales and find significantly positive abnormal 
short sales in the days leading up to large insider sales, with the short sales peaking on the day of 
large insider sales.  In addition, abnormal short sales are significantly positive and peak one day 
before the large insider sale is reported to the SEC (and therefore before the insider sale becomes 
publicly known).  In contrast, this front-running result does not hold for small insider sales.   
Further tests indicate that the front-running of large insider sales is stronger when the 
firm’s accounting information quality is poor, suggesting that information about an upcoming 
insider sale reinforces some short sellers’ adverse priors about firm value, likely triggering the 
front-running.  This result is consistent with accounting information quality being useful in 
interpreting newly arriving information (in this case, information about the upcoming insider 
sale).  We find that large insider sales at firms with poor accounting quality are followed by 
negative abnormal returns, suggesting short sellers profit from front-running such sales. 
We also examine whether front-runners appear to distinguish between opportunistic 
versus routine insider sales as identified by the Cohen et al. (2012) algorithm, and find front-
                                                 
10
 Details are available upon request. 
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running of both opportunistic and routine large insider sales.  Only the large opportunistic, but 
not routine, insider sales are followed by negative abnormal returns.  We interpret this result as 
suggesting that the average front-runner does not appear to be aware of the opportunistic versus 
routine distinction as identified by the Cohen et al. (2012) algorithm.  Alternatively, if short 
sellers are able to identify opportunistic versus routine insider sales, then the foregoing result is 
inconsistent with our front-running hypothesis. 
We identify and test several explanations that the pattern of short sales leading insider 
sales is driven by public information about the impending insider sale or by public information 
about the firm, but the evidence is inconsistent with these explanations.  This, combined with the 
finding that short sales lead large, but not small, insider sales, is consistent with information 
leakage.  
A novel feature of our evidence is that we use newly public high frequency data on short 
sales transactions.  Prior studies have used monthly short interest data, or proprietary high 
frequency data in a very few cases, to explore the return predictability of short sales, although, to 
our knowledge, no prior study has studied whether short sales front-run insider sales.    
Our results have implications for the enforcement of insider information regulations.  
Information leakage undermines market integrity, and can lead to adverse selection problems 
that limit market participation and inhibit efficient capital allocation.  Information leakage can be 
curtailed through regulatory enforcement action, or through more timely disclosure of short 
sales.   
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
 
         Number of Observations 
 
(1)  # of CEO stock sales transactions  in Thomson Financial 
       Insider database from Jan 1, 2005 to May 31, 2007   212,050 
 
(2)  Excluding cleansing code “A’ and “S” and eliminating        
       observations with missing ticker symbol   210,503 
(3)  Aggregating transactions by day   23,301 
 
(4)  Merging with NYSE SHO short sales data by ticker   
       symbol and calendar time   7,836 
(5)  Merging with CRSP by CUSIP and calendar time  
 
(6)   Keeping transaction dates in the window March 1, 2005 to  
       May 15, 2007     
  
 7,743 
 
 
                    7,100 
 
(7)  Excluding earnings announcements within 15 days of  
       insider sale  3,642 
 
(8) Keeping only the first day of insider sales as a distinct sale  2,030 
Final Sample:  2,030 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: All Insider Sale Events 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 StdDev 
Event Date Short Transactions  538 169 351 697 590 
Event Date Short Sales (%) 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.25 0.23 
Insider Sales/Shares Outstanding (%) 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.20 
Insider Sales/Trading Volume (%) 8.13 1.44 3.94 9.33 12.59 
Firm Size 7.84 6.89 7.67 8.64 1.32 
Shares Outstanding 157,787 31,999 60,691 134,121 374,194 
Market/Book  3.85 1.82 2.53 3.78 6.72 
Days between Transaction and Filing  3.09 1.00 2.00 2.00 17.26 
Average Daily Short Transactions 449 142 295 582 476 
Average Daily Short Sales (%) 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.23 0.22 
Frequency of Insider Sales 3.2 1 2 4 3.94 
 
Panel B: Large Insider Sales Events 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 StdDev 
Event Date Short Transactions  473 171 308 613 506 
Event Date Short Sales (%) 0.27 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.27 
Insider Sales/Shares Outstanding (%) 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.35 
Insider Sales/Trading Volume (%) 19.38 7.89 13.35 22.81 17.93 
Firm Size 7.29 6.64 7.14 7.84 1.04 
Shares Outstanding 71,276 29,205 45,115 70,740 96,291 
Market/Book  4.11 1.82 2.55 3.50 8.00 
Days between Transaction and Filing  3.90 1.00 2.00 3.00 19.29 
Average Daily Short Transactions 364 118 242 452 395 
Average Daily Short Sales (%) 0.21 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.24 
Frequency of Insider Sales 1.8 1 1 2 1.59 
 
Panel C: Small Insider Sales Events 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 StdDev 
Event Date Short Transactions  737 249 531 985 728 
Event Date Short Sales (%) 0.18 0.06 0.11 0.23 0.20 
Insider Sales/Shares Outstanding (%) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Insider Sales/Trading Volume (%) 1.24 0.39 0.84 1.59 1.44 
Firm Size 8.55 7.57 8.34 9.56 1.38 
Shares Outstanding 297,870 54,699 101,636 375,620 574,280 
Market/Book  3.54 1.81 2.47 3.84 5.29 
Days between Transaction and Filing  3.60 1.00 1.00 2.00 24.30 
Average Daily Short Transactions 639 230 454 858 590 
Average Daily Short Sales (%) 0.18 0.06 0.11 0.22 0.22 
Frequency of Insider Sales 2.7 1 1 2 4.68 
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of 2,030 insider sales events; Panel B (C) reports 
descriptive statistics for Large (Small) insider sales, defined as the top (bottom) 30% of Insider Sales.  
Event Date Short Transactions is the number of short sale transactions on the insider sale date. Event 
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Date Short Sales is the number of shorted shares as a percent of shares outstanding, on the insider sale 
date. Insider Sales are the shares sold by the CEO as a percent of the firm’s shares outstanding (/Shares 
Outstanding) or as a percent of normal daily trading volume (/Trading Volume). Firm Size is the 
logarithm of firm market value at the last fiscal year-end prior to the insider sale. Shares Outstanding is 
the number of shares outstanding, in thousands. Market/Book is the ratio of market value divided by book 
value of equity at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the insider sale. Days between Transaction and 
Filing is the number of days from the first day of the insider sale to the SEC Form 4 filing date. Average 
Daily Short Transactions is the average number of daily short sale transactions in the [-60,-11] trading 
day window before the insider sale. Average Daily Short Sales is the average daily number of shares 
shorted as a percentage of shares outstanding, in the [-60,-11] trading day window before the insider sale. 
Frequency of Insider Sales is the number of distinct Insider Sales in the sample period.   
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TABLE 3 
Event Study of Short Sales around Insider Sales  
 
 
 
Large Insider Sales Sample Small Insider Sales Sample 
   
Event Day 
Abnormal Short 
Sales t-stat 
Abnormal Short  
Sales t-stat 
-10 0.0065 0.97 0.0042 0.82 
-9 0.0031 0.46 0.0022 0.43 
-8 -0.0003 -0.05 -0.0019 -0.38 
-7 0.0193
***
 2.88 0.0026 0.52 
-6 0.0166
**
 2.48 -0.0029 -0.57 
-5 0.0177
***
 2.65 -0.0064 -1.26 
-4 0.0220
***
 3.28 0.0063 1.24 
-3 0.0186
***
 2.77 0.0012 0.24 
-2 0.0133
**
 1.99 -0.0036 -0.70 
-1 0.0280
***
 4.19 -0.0010 -0.19 
0 0.0564
***
 8.41 0.0056 1.09 
1 0.0295
***
 4.40 -0.0003 -0.07 
2 0.0154
**
 2.30 0.0137
***
 2.69 
3 0.0178
***
 2.65 0.0014 0.28 
4 0.0108 1.61 0.0004 0.08 
5 0.0119
*
 1.77 -0.0016 -0.32 
6 0.0137
**
 2.04 0.0029 0.57 
7 0.0147
**
 2.20 0.0081 1.58 
8 0.0082 1.23 0.0104
** 
2.03 
9 0.0156
**
 2.32 0.0058 1.14 
10 0.0181
***
 2.69 0.0099
*
 1.92 
     
Number of 
observations 608 
 
609 
 
The table reports abnormal daily short sales, as a percent of shares outstanding, in the [-10, +10] day 
window around the insider sale (day 0). Abnormal daily short sales are the daily short sales minus the 
expected daily short sales. Expected daily short sales is the mean daily short sales in the [-60, -11] day 
window excluding the earnings announcement week.  *, **, *** denotes two-tailed statistical significance 
of difference from 0 at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Number of observations is the number of insider 
sales events for the category of insider sales.  Insider Sales are the shares sold by the insider as a percent 
of the firm’s shares outstanding.  Large (Small) insider sales are the top (bottom) three deciles of insider 
sales in the full sample.  
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TABLE 4 
Regression Analysis of Short Sales around Insider Sales 
 
Indep. Variables 
 
Large Insider Sales Sample Small Insider Sales Sample 
   
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 
 
0.012
***
 3.18 0.015
***
 5.55 
Event 
 
0.011
***
 
 
2.82 -0.001 -0.31 
RET t 1.657
***
 
 
4.31 1.181
***
 18.83 
RET t-1 0.713
***
 
 
8.73 0.743
***
 17.10 
HILO t 2.440
***
 
 
7.98 2.574
***
 23.29 
HILO t-1 0.468
***
 
 
6.33 0.299
***
 4.44 
 
VOL t 12.69
***
 30.75 12.43
***
 36.42 
 
VOL t-1 0.368
*
 1.87 0.339
*
 1.90 
     
Number of 
observations 608 
 
609 
 
The table reports mean coefficients from event-level regressions of daily short sales (as a percentage of 
shares outstanding) on the independent variables listed.  A separate regression is run for each insider sale 
event.  There are 608 (609) insider sales events in the Large (Small) insider sales sample.  Large (Small) 
insider sales are the top (bottom) three deciles of insider sales in the full sample.  Insider Sales are the 
shares sold by the insider as a percent of the firm’s shares outstanding.  Event is an indicator variable that 
is “1” if the day is in the event window [-5,0], and “0” if the day is in the [-60,-11] trading day window.  
Day 0 is the insider trading date.  RETt is the firm’s daily stock return, and RETt-1 is the one-day-lagged 
RET. HILOt, or intraday price volatility, is the difference between the highest and lowest intraday price, 
scaled by the average of the highest and lowest price. HILOt-1 is the one-day-lagged HILO. VOLt is the 
daily trading volume, excluding short sales. VOLt-1 is the one-day-lagged VOL.   *, **, *** denotes two-
tailed statistical significance of difference from 0 at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  Number of 
observations is the number of regressions in the sample.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Accounting Quality and Front-Running 
Panel A: High Information Asymmetry 
            AQ 
 
R&D Mag_AR 
 
Loss Freq 
Day ab_short t_stat ab_short t_stat ab_short t_stat ab_short t_stat 
-10 -0.0100 -0.95 0.0113 0.99 0.0372 2.03
**
 0.0170 1.15 
-9 -0.0071 -0.58 0.0120 0.76 0.0062 0.37 0.0066 0.32 
-8 -0.0049 -0.41 0.0059 0.43 0.0026 0.17 0.0022 0.12 
-7 -0.0003 -0.02 0.0294 1.77
*
 0.0549 2.14
**
 0.0383 1.72
*
 
-6 -0.0027 -0.18 0.0355 1.92
*
 0.0138 0.64 0.0228 0.93 
-5 -0.0077 -0.55 0.0394 2.61
***
 0.0268 1.39 0.0362 1.70
*
 
-4 0.0072 0.46 0.0192 1.27 0.0399 1.89
*
 0.0687 2.49
**
 
-3 0.0076 0.62 0.0025 0.20 0.0250 1.28 0.0298 1.64
*
 
-2 0.0223 1.65
*
 0.0119 0.81 0.0040 0.27 0.0027 0.16 
-1 0.0324 2.35
**
 0.0381 2.36
**
 0.0326 1.74* 0.0312 1.56 
0 0.0171 1.08 0.0500 3.57
***
 0.0608 3.11
***
 0.0656 2.93
***
 
1 0.0124 0.92 0.0292 2.37
**
 0.0495 2.24 0.0679 2.72 
2 0.0173 1.16 0.0244 1.68
*
 0.0214 1.24 0.0204 1.23 
3 0.0083 0.67 0.0339 2.01 0.0345 1.71 0.0106 0.58 
4 -0.0008 -0.06 0.0082 0.69 -0.0059 -0.44 -0.0035 -0.22 
5 0.0125 0.76 0.0077 0.57 0.0023 0.12 0.0020 0.12 
6 0.0122 0.63 0.0148 0.93 0.0224 1.05 0.0108 0.58 
7 -0.0189 -1.44 0.0086 0.61 0.0077 0.42 0.0133 0.77 
8 0.0011 0.08 0.0242 1.31 0.0161 0.69 0.0083 0.37 
9 0.0053 0.38 0.0192 1.08 0.0488 1.91 0.0173 0.77 
10 -0.0052 -0.4 0.0321 2.03
**
 0.0193 1.06 0.0510 2.03
**
 
 
Panel B: Low Information Asymmetry 
      AQ 
 
R&D  Mag_AR 
 
Loss Freq 
Day ab_short t_stat ab_short t_stat ab_short t_stat ab_short t_stat 
-10 0.0101 0.76 0.0052 0.51 -0.0144 -1.30 0.0047 0.36 
-9 -0.0006 -0.06 -0.0006 -0.06 -0.0041 -0.51 -0.0010 -0.10 
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-8 -0.0176 -2.03 -0.0018 -0.19 0.0073 0.66 -0.0170 -1.61 
-7 0.0268 1.40 0.0231 1.70
*
 -0.0059 -0.72 0.0220 1.14 
-6 0.0167 0.97 0.0086 0.76 0.0114 0.81 0.0147 1.11 
-5 0.0190 1.42 0.0064 0.56 0.0172 1.31 0.0080 0.61 
-4 -0.0031 -0.29 0.0177 1.33 0.0088 0.64 -0.0002 -0.02 
-3 -0.0044 -0.39 0.0198 1.70
*
 0.0127 1.20 0.0139 0.90 
-2 -0.0068 -0.69 0.0077 0.85 0.0212 1.69
*
 0.0049 0.45 
-1 -0.0016 -0.15 0.0172 1.64
*
 0.0211 1.61 0.0164 1.34 
0 0.0270 2.23
**
 0.0614 4.15
***
 0.0489 2.30
**
 0.0626 3.63
***
 
1 0.0025 0.16 0.0260 1.95
*
 -0.0009 -0.08 0.0062 0.46 
2 -0.0146 -1.40 0.0049 0.46 -0.0064 -0.68 0.0152 0.92 
3 0.0090 0.62 0.0038 0.41 -0.0053 -0.52 0.0180 1.26 
4 -0.0025 -0.22 0.0038 0.39 0.0073 0.57 0.0019 0.16 
5 -0.0150 -1.30 0.0025 0.24 0.0043 0.33 -0.0038 -0.30 
6 0.0112 0.76 0.0070 0.63 0.0014 0.15 0.0104 0.66 
7 0.0052 0.33 0.0085 0.76 -0.0080 -0.93 -0.0007 -0.05 
8 -0.0021 -0.17 -0.0039 -0.42 -0.0075 -0.89 0.0052 0.41 
9 0.0206 1.36 0.0234 1.81
*
 -0.0075 -0.79 0.0347 1.92
*
 
10 0.0196 1.25 0.0144 1.16 -0.0015 -0.18 0.0005 0.04 
 
The table reports abnormal short sales around large insider sales, when information asymmetry is high (Panel A) versus low (Panel B).  The 
insider sale occurs on day 0. Abnormal daily short sales are the daily short sales minus the expected daily short sales, scaled by shares outstanding. 
Expected daily short sales is the mean daily short sales in the [-60, -11] day window excluding the earnings announcement week.  The information 
asymmetry measures are identified in the column headers.  AQ is the accounting quality measure of Dechow and Dichev (2002).  R&D is an 
indicator which equals 1 (0) if R&D is positive (zero).  Mag_AR is the median magnitude of short window abnormal returns around quarterly 
earnings announcements in the previous five years.  Loss Freq is the relative frequency of quarterly losses in the previous five years.  *, **, *** 
denotes two-tailed statistical significance of difference from 0 at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
TABLE 6 
Abnormal Stock Returns around Insider Sales 
 
 
 
Large Insider Sales Sample Small Insider Sales Sample 
   
Window CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
[-10,-1] 0.0273 4.51*** 0.0101 2.40** 
[0,10] -0.0018 -0.23 0.0007 0.16 
[0,20] 0.0004 0.12 -0.0002 -0.09 
 
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the [-10, +20] day window around the 
insider sale (day 0). Abnormal returns are size-adjusted returns.  *, **, *** denotes two-tailed 
statistical significance of difference from 0 at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Large (Small) 
insider sales are the top (bottom) three deciles of insider sales in the full sample.  
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TABLE 7 
Accounting Quality and Profitability of Front-Running 
 
Variables   Info Asymmetry CAR[0,10] t-stat 
 
CAR[0,20] t-stat 
AQ 
 
High 
 
-0.0147 -1.95 * 
 
-0.0308 -2.56*** 
  
Low 
 
-0.0058 -0.73 
 
-0.0078 -0.75 
     
R&D  High  -0.0047 -0.88 
 
-0.0052 -0.47 
  Low  -0.0013 -0.25 
 
-0.0008 -0.10 
        
Mag_AR 
 
High 
 
-0.0040 -0.47 
 
-0.0049 -0.36 
  
Low 
 
0.0037 0.44 
 
0.0041 0.29 
     
Loss Freq  High  0.0098 1.48 
 
0.0071 0.46 
  Low  -0.0084 -1.34 
 
-0.0135 -1.47 
 
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) after large insider sales, when information 
asymmetry is high versus low. Abnormal returns are size-adjusted returns. The insider sale occurs 
on day 0. CAR [0, 20] is the CAR from trading day 0 to trading day 20.  AQ is the accounting 
quality measure of Dechow and Dichev (2002).  R&D is an indicator which equals 1 (0) if R&D 
is positive (zero).  Mag_AR is the median magnitude of short window abnormal returns around 
quarterly earnings announcements in the previous five years. Loss Freq is the relative frequency 
of quarterly losses in the previous five years.  *, **, *** denotes two-tailed statistical significance 
of difference from 0 at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
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TABLE 8 
Opportunistic Insider Sales and Profitability of Front-Running 
 
 Opportunistic Routine 
Window CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
     
[0,5] -0.0026 -0.71 0.0050 1.19 
[0,10] -0.0061 -1.09 0.0049 0.88 
[0,20] -0.0152 -2.05** 0.0143 1.38 
     
Num of 
observations 243  360  
 
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns following large insider sales, when the insider sale 
is opportunistic versus routine. Abnormal returns are size-adjusted returns. Day 0 is the day on 
which the insider sale occurs. Opportunistic and routine insider sales are identified using the 
algorithm in Cohen et al. (2012). *, **, *** denotes two-tailed statistical significance of 
difference from 0 at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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FIGURE 1 
Daily Abnormal Short Sales around Insider Sales: Full sample 
 
Panel A:Daily Short Sales around Insider Trading Date 
 
 
Panel B:Daily Short Sales around SEC Filing Date 
 
 
Figure 1 shows daily abnormal short sales, as a percent of shares outstanding, for the full sample. 
Abnormal short sales are short sales in excess of the mean daily short sales in the [-60, -11] 
trading day window, excluding the week with an earnings announcement.  Day 0 is either the 
insider sale date (Panel A) or the SEC Form filing date (Panel B).  For Panel B, we use the 1,998 
insider sale observations for which the SEC Form 4 is filed within 10 days after the insider sale. 
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FIGURE 2 
Daily Abnormal Short Sales around Large versus Small Insider Sales 
 
Panel A:  Daily Short Sales around Insider Trading Date 
 
 
Panel B: Daily Short Sales around SEC Filing Date 
 
 
Figure 2 shows daily abnormal short sales, as a percent of shares outstanding, in the [-10, +10] 
trading day window.  Abnormal short sales are short sales in excess of the mean daily short sales 
in the [-60, -11] trading day window, excluding the week with an earnings announcement.  Day 0 
is either the insider sale date (Panel A) or the SEC Form filing date (Panel B).  The two panels 
show daily abnormal short sales around large insider sales and around small insider sales.  Insider 
Sales are the shares sold by the insider as a percent of the firm’s shares outstanding.  Large 
(Small) insider sales are the top (bottom) three deciles of insider sales in the full sample. 
 
